Open Yale Courses

ECON 159: Game Theory

Lecture 12 - Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression,
and cycles
<< previous session | next session >>

Overview:

We apply the idea of evolutionary stability to consider the evolution of social conventions. Then we consider games that involve aggressive (Hawk) and passive (Dove) strategies, finding that sometimes, evolutionary populations are mixed. We discuss how such games can help us to predict how behavior might vary across settings. Finally, we consider a game in which there is no evolutionary stable population and discuss an example from nature.

Reading assignment:

Handout on ESS in Pure Strategies [PDF]

Class lecture:

Transcript
html
Audio
mp3
Video
medium bandwidth
low bandwidth
high bandwidth

Resources:

Blackboard Notes Lecture 12 [PDF]

Yale University 2008.  Some rights reserved. Unless otherwise indicated on this page or on the Open Yale Courses website, all content on this page is licensed under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0)